Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
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Publication:1642171
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.003zbMath1393.91006MaRDI QIDQ1642171
Philippe Solal, Sylvain Ferrières, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila
Publication date: 20 June 2018
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.003
05C05: Trees
91A12: Cooperative games
91A43: Games involving graphs
05C57: Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects)
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