A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
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Publication:2434245
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018zbMath1284.91078OpenAlexW1998136044MaRDI QIDQ2434245
Nigel Moes, Gerard van der Laan, René van den Brink
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/12050.pdf
implementationhierarchical outcomeaverage tree solutioncycle-free graph gameweighted hierarchical outcome
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