Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
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Publication:892847
DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0899-YzbMATH Open1341.91016DBLPjournals/scw/BrinkF15OpenAlexW954238337WikidataQ59404777 ScholiaQ59404777MaRDI QIDQ892847FDOQ892847
Authors: René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki 
Publication date: 12 November 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0899-y
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Cited In (22)
- A new basis and the Shapley value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
- A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- The efficient, symmetric and linear values for cooperative games and their characterizations
- The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
- On \(\alpha\)-constant-sum games
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- Recursive and bargaining values
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Hart--Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value
- On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
- New characterizations of the discounted Shapley values
- Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
- Discounted tree solutions
- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
- The burning coalition bargaining model
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