On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.016zbMath1368.91019OpenAlexW1505932656MaRDI QIDQ745011

Miklós Pintér, René van den Brink

Publication date: 12 October 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/12092.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryShapley valueassignment gamegraph gamesubmarket efficiencyvaluation fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites Work

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