The Shapley value of exact assignment games

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0068-8zbMath1131.91007OpenAlexW2014930410MaRDI QIDQ878169

Peter Sudhölter, Maike Hoffmann

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0068-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young's theorem ⋮ From the bankruptcy problem and its concede-and-divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution ⋮ Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets ⋮ On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games ⋮ A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game

Cites Work

• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• Cooperative games with large cores
• The Shapley value and average convex games
• Assignment games with stable core
• Cores of convex games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Cores of exact games. I
• The modiclus and core stability

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