The modiclus and core stability

DOI10.1007/S00182-005-0207-7zbMATH Open1094.91006OpenAlexW2064963398MaRDI QIDQ2576646FDOQ2576646

Authors: Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan, Peter Sudhölter 

Publication date: 14 December 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0207-7

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zbMATH Keywords

CoremodiclusStable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (5)

• Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
• The Shapley value of exact assignment games
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness

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