The modiclus and core stability

DOI10.1007/S00182-005-0207-7MaRDI QIDQ2576646zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date 14 December 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0207-7

zbMATH Keywords

CoremodiclusStable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

Consider a cooperative transferable utility game (TU game). The prenucleolus is obtained by lexicographically minimizing the non increasing ordered vector of excesses of the coalitions within the set of Pareto optimal payoff vectors. The modiclus is obtained by lexicographically minimizing the non increasing ordered vector of differences of excesses of the coalitions within the set of Pareto optimal payoff vectors. It is shown that the modiclus assigns a singleton to any TU game. Also it selects a member of the core for any exact orthogonal game and for any assignment game that has a stable core. An example is given to show that there is an exact TU game with a stable core that does not contain the modiclus.

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Cited in

(5)

• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
• Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
• The Shapley value of exact assignment games

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