The modiclus and core stability

DOI10.1007/S00182-005-0207-7MaRDI QIDQ2576646zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date 14 December 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0207-7

zbMATH Keywords

CoremodiclusStable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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(5)

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• Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness

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