Stable cores of large games

DOI10.1007/S001820400191zbMATH Open1128.91006OpenAlexW2066727382MaRDI QIDQ2487963FDOQ2487963

Authors: Massimo Marinacci, Luigi Montrucchio 

Publication date: 17 August 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400191

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zbMATH Keywords

bargaining setslarge coresTV gamesvN-M stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (12)

• Fault tolerance in large games
• Shapley value of homogeneous cooperative games
• Cores of non-atomic market games
• The bargaining set of a large game
• STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION
• Large games: Fair and stable outcomes
• On the core and Shapley value for regular polynomial games
• The modiclus and core stability
• Approximate Cores of Large Games
• Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
• Stability and largeness of the core

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