Stable cores of large games

DOI10.1007/S001820400191MaRDI QIDQ2487963zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Massimo Marinacci, Luigi Montrucchio

Publication date 17 August 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400191

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining setslarge coresTV gamesvN-M stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(16)

• Large games: Fair and stable outcomes
• Large cores and exactness
• On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set
• The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games
• Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics
• Fault tolerance in large games
• On the core and Shapley value for regular polynomial games
• Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games
• The modiclus and core stability
• Approximate Cores of Large Games
• STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION
• Stability and largeness of the core
• Shapley value of homogeneous cooperative games
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
• Cores of non-atomic market games
• The bargaining set of a large game

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