Large cores and exactness

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0686zbMath0957.91009OpenAlexW1997386322MaRDI QIDQ1300671

Mark Voorneveld, Amit K. Biswas, Thiruvenkatachari Parthasarathy, Jos A. M. Potters

Publication date: 1 September 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0686

zbMATH Keywords

large coreexact gametotally balanced symmetric games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (28)

Stable allocations of risk ⋮ STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ On some families of cooperative fuzzy games ⋮ Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games ⋮ CONVEX GAMES VERSUS CLAN GAMES ⋮ Preface: International conference on game theory and optimization, June 6--10, 2016, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India ⋮ New characterizations for largeness of the core ⋮ Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility ⋮ Minimal balanced collections and their application to core stability and other topics of game theory ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games ⋮ Balancedness conditions for exact games ⋮ Minimal large sets for cooperative games ⋮ A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ Pricing rules and Arrow-Debreu ambiguous valuation ⋮ Sandwich games ⋮ Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core ⋮ Core stability in chain-component additive games ⋮ Stability and largeness of the core ⋮ Algorithms for core stability, core largeness, exactness, and extendability of flow games ⋮ Monotonicity and egalitarianism ⋮ Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability ⋮ Convex games with an infinite number of players and sequencing situations ⋮ The boundary of the core of a balanced game: face games ⋮ Convex interval games ⋮ Concave integral with respect to imprecise probabilities

Cites Work

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• Cores and large cores when population varies
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Prosperty properties of TU-games
• Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games
• Cores of exact games. I
• Some Recent Developments inn-Person Game Theory

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