Prosperty properties of TU-games

DOI10.1007/S001820050106zbMATH Open0941.91008OpenAlexW2056481063MaRDI QIDQ1295843FDOQ1295843

Authors: J. R. G. van Gellekom, J. H. Reijnierse, Jos Potters 

Publication date: 5 October 1999

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050106

Recommendations

• Stability and largeness of the core
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2212593
• On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set
• New necessary conditions for the stability of the core in cooperative games

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamestransferable utility gamecharacteristic function formstable corelarge coreprosperityVon Neumann-Morgenstern solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (24)

• Algorithms for core stability, core largeness, exactness, and extendability of flow games
• Large cores and exactness
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• On the semivalues and the power core of cooperative TU games
• On balanced games with infinitely many players: revisiting Schmeidler's result
• The bargaining set for almost-convex games
• Core stability in chain-component additive games
• ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES
• Monotonicity and egalitarianism
• On some families of cooperative fuzzy games
• A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes
• Semiproportional values for TU games
• STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION
• Concave integral with respect to imprecise probabilities
• Minimal large sets for cooperative games
• The aggregate-monotonic core
• Stable cores in information graph games
• Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
• New characterizations for largeness of the core
• A note on characterizing core stability with fuzzy games
• Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
• Stability and largeness of the core

This page was built for publication: Prosperty properties of TU-games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1295843)