On balanced games with infinitely many players: revisiting Schmeidler's result

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2023.01.011zbMath1525.91009arXiv2207.14672MaRDI QIDQ6161904

Miklós Pintér, David Bartl

Publication date: 28 June 2023

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.14672

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesscorebounded additive set functionsTU games with infinitely many playerssigned TU gamesTU games with restricted cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Linear programming (90C05)

Cites Work

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• Algebraic duality theorems for infinite LP problems
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• On the core of a collection of coalitions.
• Countably additive measures in cores of games
• Cores of games with restricted cooperation
• Refinement Derivatives and Values of Games
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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