Core stability in chain-component additive games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.005zbMath1135.91320MaRDI QIDQ2483120

Tamás Solymosi, Bas van Velzen, Herbert Hamers

Publication date: 28 April 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/629369/101.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

large core; core stability; exact game; graph-restricted games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core, New characterizations for largeness of the core, Balancedness conditions for exact games, Multi-sided assignment games on \(m\)-partite graphs

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