Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core

DOI10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4zbMath1275.91013MaRDI QIDQ376722

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 19 November 2013

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4

zbMATH Keywords

accessibility; simple games; excess function; coalition structure core; core stability; outsider independent domination; payoff configuration; veto player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments, On the characterizations of viable proposals, The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games, Paths to stability for overlapping group structures, Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem

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