Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core

DOI10.1007/S00186-013-0439-4zbMATH Open1275.91013OpenAlexW2057486112MaRDI QIDQ376722FDOQ376722

Authors: Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal 

Publication date: 19 November 2013

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4

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zbMATH Keywords

accessibilitysimple gamesexcess functioncoalition structure corecore stabilityoutsider independent dominationpayoff configurationveto player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• Cores of convex games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• Game theory
• Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Cooperative games with large cores
• The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
• Assignment games with stable core
• Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games
• Core tâtonnement
• An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
• Core stability in chain-component additive games
• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• On the number of blocks required to access the core
• Viable Proposals
• Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks

Cited In (11)

• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• On the characterizations of viable proposals
• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• On the number of blocks required to access the core
• An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes

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