Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core

DOI10.1007/S00186-013-0439-4MaRDI QIDQ376722zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date 19 November 2013

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4

zbMATH Keywords

accessibilitysimple gamesexcess functioncoalition structure corecore stabilityoutsider independent dominationpayoff configurationveto player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• The coalition structure core is accessible
• On the stability of coalition structures
• On the stability of an optimal coalition structure
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3934814
• Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
• Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1665667

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226100 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
• An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
• Assignment games with stable core
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games
• Core stability in chain-component additive games
• Core tâtonnement
• Cores of convex games
• Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core
• Game theory
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• On the number of blocks required to access the core
• Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
• Viable Proposals

Cited in

(11)

• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• On the characterizations of viable proposals
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
• Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
• On the number of blocks required to access the core
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability

This page was built for publication: Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q376722)