The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.02.003MaRDI QIDQ2031172zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors László Á. Kóczy, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date 8 June 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

coalition structure coresequential dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• A property of the core
• A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games
• A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games
• Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
• An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• On the accessibility of the core
• On the characterizations of viable proposals
• On the number of blocks required to access the core
• Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
• The farsighted stable set
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Viable Proposals

Cited in

(3)

• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core

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