The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.11.004MaRDI QIDQ2462287zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors László Á. Kóczy, Luc Lauwers

Publication date 30 November 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2002/Volume28/EB-02AA0011A.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

absorbing setcoredynamic solutionnon-emptiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• A property of the core
• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Viable Proposals

Cited in

(11)

• A property of the core
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games
• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4079201 (Why is no real title available?)
• Nonempty core-type solutions over balanced coalitions in TU-games
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
• Two solutions on TU games with preference relations: the core and the globally stable solution
• On the characterizations of viable proposals
• On the accessibility of the core

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