The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.004zbMath1271.91019MaRDI QIDQ2462287

Luc Lauwers, László Á. Kóczy

Publication date: 30 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2002/Volume28/EB-02AA0011A.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

core; absorbing set; dynamic solution; non-emptiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES, Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core, Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes, On the characterizations of viable proposals, On the accessibility of the core, The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games, Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem

Cites Work

• The coalition structure core is accessible
• A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• A property of the core
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• Viable Proposals