On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach

DOI10.1007/BF01770064MaRDI QIDQ1131966zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Prakash P. Shenoy

Publication date 1979

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770064

zbMATH Keywords

abstract game modelsbargaining setcoalition formation: n-person cooperative gamescoredynamic solutionindividually rational payoffsShapley valueside payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(59)

• Structural holes in social networks: A remark
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
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• More on the stable, generalized stable, absorbing and admissible sets
• Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• On coalition formation in simple games: A mathematical analysis of Caplow's and Gamson's theories
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• An algorithm for computing the stable coalition structures in tree-graph communication games
• On aspiration solutions in predicting coalition formation in cooperative games
• Equilibrium binding agreements
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• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
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• Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach
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• Stable governments and the semistrict core
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
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• A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members
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• Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey
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• A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions
• A dynamic approach to cartel formation
• Population monotonic path schemes for simple games
• A recursive core for partition function form games

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