On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
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Publication:1131966
DOI10.1007/BF01770064zbMath0418.90096MaRDI QIDQ1131966
Publication date: 1979
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Shapley value; core; bargaining set; side payments; dynamic solution; abstract game models; coalition formation: n-person cooperative games; individually rational payoffs
91A12: Cooperative games
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Cites Work
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