Structural holes in social networks: A remark

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.05.007MaRDI QIDQ1001835zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicolas Houy

Publication date 19 February 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

intermediationnetwork formationnetworksstructural holes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

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Cites work

• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Structural holes in social networks

Cited in

(6)

• Structural holes in social networks with exogenous cliques
• The formation of a core-periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks
• Structural holes in social networks
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5070371 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6263733 (Why is no real title available?)
• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

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