VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM

DOI10.1142/S0219198900000068MaRDI QIDQ4521369zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors María Paz Espinosa, Elena Inarra

Publication date 19 March 2001

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000068

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition

Cited in

(6)

• Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
• Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
• Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies
• Equilibrium selection in a merger game
• Stable cartel configurations and product differentiation: the case of multiple cartels
• A dynamic approach to cartel formation

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