Equilibrium selection in a merger game

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00422-0MaRDI QIDQ5941392zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Alex Possajennikov

Publication date 20 August 2001

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00422-0

zbMATH Keywords

coordination problemequilibrium selectionmergers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior

Cited in

(3)

• Endogenous mergers under multi-market competition
• Political mergers as coalition formation: an analysis of the \textit{Heisei} municipal amalgamations
• Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games

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