The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
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Publication:2021793
DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00745-xzbMath1461.91015OpenAlexW3094031135MaRDI QIDQ2021793
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2018/11/No.E1809.pdf
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