The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102791zbMATH Open1505.91049OpenAlexW4309796579MaRDI QIDQ2685998FDOQ2685998

Authors: Guangjing Yang, Hao Sun 

Publication date: 24 February 2023

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102791

Recommendations

• The recursive core for non-superadditive games
• A recursive core for partition function form games
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zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamepartition functionexternalitiesrecursive nucleolus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• N‐person games in partition function form
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• The recursive core for non-superadditive games
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
• Games in sequencing situations with externalities
• The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
• Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games

Cited In (4)

• The reciprocity set
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach

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