The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
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Publication:2685998
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543876 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078999 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- Games in sequencing situations with externalities
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- N‐person games in partition function form
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
- The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
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