Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
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Recommendations
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
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- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841921
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers
- A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
- A recursive core for partition function form games
- A simple noncooperative core story
- Bargaining without commitment
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- Fixed rules and decision rules: time consistency and subgame perfection
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- N‐person games in partition function form
- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
Cited in
(8)- Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- RECURSIVE SEQUENCES IDENTIFYING THE NUMBER OF EMBEDDED COALITIONS
- The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
- Subgame perfect coalition formation
- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
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