Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities

DOI10.1007/S10479-022-04669-5MaRDI QIDQ2095948zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors László Á. Kóczy

Publication date 15 November 2022

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04669-5

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesnetworksrecursive coresocial bubble

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments

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