Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
coalitional games with externalitiescoreCournot oligopoliesenvironmental economicspartition function form gamesShapley value
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
This book presents a survey on partition function form games. It is divided into 4 parts that contain in total 14 chapters. Part I consisting of 3 chapters concerns a general introduction and foundations. In Chapters 1 and 2, the author presents the purpose of the book, and basic terminology and notation, respectively. Chapter 3 introduces preliminaries on different form games and recalls normal and extensive form games, characteristic function form games and partition function form games. Part II of the book consists of 4 chapters and deals with stability. More precisely, in Chapter 4 the author focuses on the concept of dominance, where direct dominance models, coalition formation rules, and farsightedness are discussed. Chapter 5 is devoted to the core and presents various core concepts generalized for games in partition function form. In Chapter 6, the issue of implementation of the core is discussed. The author recalls simultaneous announcement models, alternating offers bargaining model, sequential coalition formation with fixed payoffs division, sequential coalition formation in totally balanced games, and implementation in general partition function form games. Chapter 7 presents other stability concepts like the stable set and the equilibrium binding agreements. Part III with 3 chapters deals with the concept of fairness. In Chapter 8, the author presents different extensions of axioms for characteristic function form games to partition function form games. Chapter 9 is devoted to the Shapley value. The author recalls some modified axioms for partition function games, the generalized Shapley values for partition function form games, the potential approach for partition function form games, as well as implementation and the calculation of the extended Shapley values. In Chapter 10, other values are presented. More precisely, the Banzhaf value, the consensus value, coalition formation values, and externalities in networks are discussed. Part IV contains 4 chapters and focuses on applications. Chapter 11 deals with oligopoly models. Coalition formation in Cournot oligopolies, symmetric Cournot merger system, mergers with antitrust regulation, and mergers in international oligopolies are discussed. In Chapter 12, the author presents some environmental applications, such as international environmental agreements, tragedy of the commons in a fishing lake, straddling stock fisheries, and the issue of sharing a river. Chapter 13 considers femtocell networks. Joint frequency scheduling and interference alignment are recalled. Chapter 14 presents some further applications that concern traffic routing, electrical power transmission networks, matching with externalities, and free trade agreements and customs unions.
- Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
- A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
- Equilibrium coalition structures of differential games in partition function form
- COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
- Marginality and convexity in partition function form games
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
- N‐person games in partition function form
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3920252
- Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach
- The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
- A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
- The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
- Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
- The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
- Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach
- Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game
- Equilibrium coalition structures of differential games in partition function form
- Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
- Fair division in the presence of externalities
- Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
- Marginality and convexity in partition function form games
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- Stability and values for games with coalition structures
- Linear-state differential games in partition function form
- N‐person games in partition function form
- Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
- Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources
- Competition and cooperation in linear production and sequencing processes
- Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements
- Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games
- Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- Optimistic and pessimistic approaches for cooperative games
- Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form
- Non-cooperative representations of cooperative games
- Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value
- Power in plurality voting games
- A null-player axiom for the Myerson value in partition function form games: a note
- Freedom and voting power
- Two families of values for global cooperative games
- With a little help from my friends: essentiality vs opportunity in group criticality
- Product assortment games under multinomial logit model with endogenous network effects
- Bidding with coalitional externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games
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