Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements

DOI10.3934/JDG.2024004zbMATH Open1539.91006MaRDI QIDQ6537261FDOQ6537261

Authors: Shimai Su, Elena M. Parilina 

Publication date: 14 May 2024

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycooperationcoalition structurefeasible coalitionenvironmental agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• Pollution control: A differential game approach
• The Shapley value for games on matroids: the static model
• Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game
• A dynamic game of waste management
• Stochastic Approach for Determining Stable Coalition Structure
• Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
• Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
• Stable cooperation in a game with a major player
• Trade-off mechanism to sustain cooperation in pollution reduction
• Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?

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