Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements
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Publication:6537261
Recommendations
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- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
Cites work
- A dynamic game of waste management
- Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids
- Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
- Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
- Pollution control: A differential game approach
- Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
- Stable cooperation in a game with a major player
- Stochastic Approach for Determining Stable Coalition Structure
- The Shapley value for games on matroids: the static model
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Trade-off mechanism to sustain cooperation in pollution reduction
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