Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids
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Publication:1395144
DOI10.1007/s001860200250zbMath1060.91006OpenAlexW1525213644MaRDI QIDQ1395144
René van den Brink, Encarnación Algaba, Andrés Jiménez-Losada, Jésus Mario Bilbao
Publication date: 26 June 2003
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860200250
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