Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation
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Publication:2095935
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Cites work
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Cited in
(16)- Consistent restricted Shapley values
- Closure spaces and restricted games
- The Shapley value of conjunctive-restricted games
- Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation
- Games and cooperation indices
- The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths
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- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
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- The generalized position values for communication games with coalition configuration
- A new value for cooperative games on intersection-closed systems
- A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures
- Positivity of incomplete cooperative games revisited
- How do I explain that decision? A new approach combining counterfactuals and sensitivity analyses
- A dividend-based approach to the solidarity value: structural decomposition and axiomatic characterizations
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