The Myerson value for union stable structures
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Publication:1397017
DOI10.1007/S001860100159zbMATH Open1059.91006OpenAlexW2036145416MaRDI QIDQ1397017FDOQ1397017
Authors: J. J. López, Encarnación Algaba, Jésus Mario Bilbao, Peter Borm
Publication date: 16 July 2003
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860100159
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