The Myerson value for union stable structures

DOI10.1007/S001860100159MaRDI QIDQ1397017zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. J. López, Encarnación Algaba, Jésus Mario Bilbao, Peter Borm

Publication date 16 July 2003

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860100159

zbMATH Keywords

communication situationspermission structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• The Myerson value and superfluous supports in union stable systems
• Efficient Myerson value for union stable structures
• The position value in communication structures.
• The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions
• An axiomatization of the Myerson value

Cited in

(39)

• A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation
• A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities
• The Myerson value for directed graph games
• A discrete Choquet integral for ordered systems
• Cooperative games with partial information
• Network structures with hierarchy and communication
• The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions
• Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation
• A note on a value with incomplete communication
• The position value in communication structures.
• The Myerson value and superfluous supports in union stable systems
• Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation
• The degree value for games with communication structure
• The within groups and the between groups Myerson values
• Weighted component fairness for forest games
• The position value for union stable systems
• Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation
• The average tree value for hypergraph games
• The prenucleolus for games with restricted cooperation
• Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures
• The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
• On hierarchies and communication
• Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value
• Efficient Myerson value for union stable structures
• Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems
• Power measures and solutions for games under precedence constraints
• Allocation rules for coalitional network games
• Coalitional stochastic stability
• Shapley value of a cooperative game with fuzzy set of feasible coalitions
• Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
• A partition-graph restricted cooperative game with incomplete information
• Essential Players in Cooperative Games with Graph Communication Structure
• Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure
• Decomposition of network communication games
• Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
• Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation
• The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations
• The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure

This page was built for publication: The Myerson value for union stable structures

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1397017)