The Myerson value for union stable structures

DOI10.1007/S001860100159MaRDI QIDQ1397017zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. J. López, Encarnación Algaba, Jésus Mario Bilbao, Peter Borm

Publication date 16 July 2003

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860100159

zbMATH Keywords

communication situationspermission structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cited in

(39)

• Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure
• Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation
• The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations
• Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
• Allocation rules for coalitional network games
• Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation
• Network structures with hierarchy and communication
• Shapley value of a cooperative game with fuzzy set of feasible coalitions
• Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value
• The average tree value for hypergraph games
• A partition-graph restricted cooperative game with incomplete information
• The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions
• Essential Players in Cooperative Games with Graph Communication Structure
• A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities
• A note on a value with incomplete communication
• The prenucleolus for games with restricted cooperation
• The Myerson value for directed graph games
• Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures
• Efficient Myerson value for union stable structures
• Weighted component fairness for forest games
• A discrete Choquet integral for ordered systems
• On hierarchies and communication
• The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
• The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
• The Myerson value and superfluous supports in union stable systems
• The position value for union stable systems
• Coalitional stochastic stability
• Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation
• Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems
• A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation
• Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation
• The degree value for games with communication structure
• The position value in communication structures.
• Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
• Power measures and solutions for games under precedence constraints
• The within groups and the between groups Myerson values
• Decomposition of network communication games
• Cooperative games with partial information

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