A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2010.07.007MaRDI QIDQ643011zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors U. Faigle, Jan Voss

Publication date 27 October 2011

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2010.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

allocationcooperationcoreentropygameinteractionrandomizationstatesymmetrysystemvalueWeber set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
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Cites work

• A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games
• Automorphisms and weighted values
• Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
• Choice functions and abstract convex geometries
• Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
• Cooperative games on antimatroids
• Entropy of capacities on lattices and set systems
• Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Greedoids
• Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on coalition formation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1599890 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1033382 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Interaction indices for games on combinatorial structures with forbidden coalitions
• Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
• Multilinear Extensions of Games
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• On weighted Shapley values
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• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• The core of games on convex geometries
• THE MARGINAL OPERATORS FOR GAMES ON CONVEX GEOMETRIES
• The Myerson value for union stable structures
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
• The Shapley value for games on matroids: the static model
• The Shapley value on convex geometries
• The theory of convex geometries
• Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws

Cited in

(7)

• Special issue: Cooperation in selfish systems. Papers based on the presentations at the workshop, Bertinoro, Italy, May 27--28, 2006.
• Values for Markovian coalition processes
• Cooperative games on simplicial complexes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4174371 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5657796 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior
• Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems

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