On weighted Shapley values
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Publication:1096554
DOI10.1007/BF01756292zbMath0633.90100MaRDI QIDQ1096554
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A12: Cooperative games
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