On weighted Shapley values
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DOI10.1007/BF01756292zbMATH Open0633.90100MaRDI QIDQ1096554FDOQ1096554
Authors: Dov Samet, Ehud Kalai 
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values
- The proportional Shapley value and applications
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- The effects of excluding coalitions
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- Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation
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- Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values
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