The effects of excluding coalitions
Summary: One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value (\(\varphi^E\) value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.
- Values with exogenous payments
- Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the marketplace.
- Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions
- Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
- Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions
- A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
- An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure
- Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures
- Axioms for Shapley values in games with quarrelling
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Cooperation when some players are incompatible
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Link formation in cooperative situations.
- Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- On weighted Shapley values
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
- Spectrum value for coalitional games
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