SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Semivalues of Simple Games
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
- Subjective evaluations of n-person games
- Utility functions for simple games
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Weighted weak semivalues
Cited in
(14)- Monotonicity of power and power measures
- Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- Powers of subgroups in voting bodies
- An axiomatization of success
- The effects of excluding coalitions
- The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
- Potential, value, and coalition formation
- On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
- Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
- Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions
- Reflections on power, voting, and voting power
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1369847 (Why is no real title available?)
- Voting and power
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