Weighted weak semivalues
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When the Shapley value (for \(n\)-person games) is investigated the following axioms are imposed on a solution of the games: linearity, positivity, dummy, symmetry and efficiency. By dropping the axioms efficiency and symmetry we get the class of probabilistic values. In this paper two subclasses of probabilistic values are defined and characterized. By adding the axiom of balanced contributions we obtain the family of weak semivalues. If the axiom of weighted balanced contributions is added we get the family of weighted weak semivalues.
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- Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values
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