Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
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Publication:1728366
Recommendations
- Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
- Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values
- Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
- Extensions of solution concepts by means of muliplicative \(\epsilon\)-tax games
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
- Weighted weak semivalues
Cited in
(20)- The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
- Balanced contributions for TU games with awards and applications
- A characterization of the Owen value via sign symmetries
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities
- Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions
- Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
- The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
- Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values
- Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution
- A reduced Harsanyi power solution for cooperative games with a weight vector
- Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited
- Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games
- Calculating direct and indirect contributions of players in cooperative games via the multi-linear extension
- Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Strongly balanced cooperative games
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