Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities
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Publication:2353258
DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9402-3zbMATH Open1377.91022OpenAlexW2081211424MaRDI QIDQ2353258FDOQ2353258
Authors: Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo 
Publication date: 9 July 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9402-3
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cooperative gamesaxiomatic characterizationegalitarian valueproportional valuerelative contributions
Cites Work
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- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
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- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
- Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
- The proportional value for positive cooperative games
- Extensions of solution concepts by means of muliplicative \(\epsilon\)-tax games
- Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
- Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom
Cited In (3)
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