Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9402-3MaRDI QIDQ2353258zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

Publication date 9 July 2015

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9402-3

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesaxiomatic characterizationegalitarian valueproportional valuerelative contributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
• Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom
• Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
• Extensions of solution concepts by means of muliplicative \(\epsilon\)-tax games
• Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• The proportional value for positive cooperative games
• Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value

Cited in

(6)

• Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
• Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
• Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
• Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games

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