Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
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Publication:2325653
Recommendations
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
- The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities
Cites work
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Balanced contributions for TU games with awards and applications
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1031402 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- On new characterizations of the Owen value
- On weighted Shapley values
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Cited in
(11)- The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
- Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions
- Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
- Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978454 (Why is no real title available?)
- The in-group egalitarian Owen values
- Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
- Fair allocation in hierarchies: a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism
- Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the priority Shapley value for multi-choice games
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