Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
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Publication:532755
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0187-0zbMath1211.91041MaRDI QIDQ532755
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0187-0
91A12: Cooperative games
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