Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0187-0MaRDI QIDQ532755zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

Publication date 5 May 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0187-0

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatizationbalanced cycle contributions propertyShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• An axiomatization of the -value
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
• On cores and indivisibility

Cited in

(28)

• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
• Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value
• The position value and the structures of graphs
• Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions
• A fuzzy cooperative game theoretic approach for multinational water resource spatiotemporal allocation
• Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
• Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
• Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
• Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities
• On a class of solidarity values
• Preservation of risk in capital markets
• Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value
• The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
• Non-cooperative and axiomatic characterizations of the average lexicographic value
• Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
• Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
• On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
• The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
• A new value for communication situations
• Axioms on cohesive players and axiomatizations of the positively weighted Shapley values
• Fair link contributions for values of network cooperative games
• Modifications of several axiomatizations of the Shapley value by weakening the efficiency axiom
• Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value
• Early contributors and fair rewards in crowdfunding

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