Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
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Publication:2512342
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.008zbMath1293.91013OpenAlexW2157896294MaRDI QIDQ2512342
Publication date: 7 August 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.008
monotonicitysolidarityequal division valueequal surplus division valuenullifying playerdummifying player
Related Items (29)
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- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
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- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
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