Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value

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Publication:2512342

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.008zbMath1293.91013OpenAlexW2157896294MaRDI QIDQ2512342

Frank Huettner, André Casajus

Publication date: 7 August 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.008




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