Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
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Publication:2512342
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.008zbMath1293.91013MaRDI QIDQ2512342
Publication date: 7 August 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.008
monotonicity; solidarity; equal division value; equal surplus division value; nullifying player; dummifying player
91A12: Cooperative games
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