Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
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Publication:2512342
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Cites work
- A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Cited in
(39)- Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
- Egalitarian allocation and players of certain type
- The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
- Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
- Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value
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- Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
- Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Differential marginality, inessential games and convex combinations of values
- Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures
- Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
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- Order preservation with dummies in the museum pass problem
- Solidarity value for graph games
- Deriving Egalitarian and proportional principles from individual monotonicity
- On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
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