A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
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Publication:1322442
DOI10.1007/BF01242845zbMath0805.90125MaRDI QIDQ1322442
Andrzej S. Nowak, Tadeusz Radzik
Publication date: 5 May 1994
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A12: Cooperative games
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