Solidarity value and solidarity share functions for TU fuzzy games
Summary: TU games under both crisp and fuzzy environments describe situations where players make full (crisp) or partial (fuzzy) binding agreements and generate worth in return. The challenge is then to decide how to distribute the profit among them in a rational manner: we call this a solution. In this paper, we introduce the notion of solidarity value and the solidarity share function as a suitable solution to TU fuzzy games. Two special classes of TU fuzzy games, namely, TU fuzzy games in Choquet integral form and in multilinear extension form, are studied and the corresponding solidarity value and the solidarity share functions are characterized.
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Fuzzy share functions for cooperative fuzzy games
- Share functions for cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions
- A simplified expression of share functions for cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2139460
- A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games.
- A simplified expression of share functions for cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions
- A simplified expression of the Shapley function for fuzzy game
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Axiomatization of a class of share functions for \(n\)-person games
- Cooperative Fuzzy Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Meaningful and meaningless solutions for cooperative \(n\)-person games
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- Share functions for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
- Stability and Shapley value for an n-persons fuzzy game
- The Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form
This page was built for publication: Solidarity value and solidarity share functions for TU fuzzy games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1787435)