MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
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Publication:3502821
DOI10.1142/S0219198907001412zbMath1139.91309MaRDI QIDQ3502821
Publication date: 20 May 2008
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ UNIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: SOME INSIGHTS FROM A SIMPLE THREE-PLAYER EXAMPLE ⋮ OUTSIDE OPTIONS IN PROBABILISTIC COALITION SITUATIONS ⋮ On the stability of couples ⋮ Stability and values for games with coalition structures ⋮ Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory ⋮ On the stability of coalition structures ⋮ Null players, outside options, and stability: the conditional Shapley value ⋮ The in-group egalitarian Owen values ⋮ Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets ⋮ Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options ⋮ Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom ⋮ THE AUMANN-DRÈZE VALUE, THE WIESE VALUE, AND STABILITY: A NOTE ⋮ Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation ⋮ Networks and outside options ⋮ Outside options, component efficiency, and stability ⋮ On the structural stability of values for cooperative games ⋮ Generating Functions of Weighted Voting Games, MacMahon’s Partition Analysis, and Clifford Algebras ⋮ The proportional partitional Shapley value ⋮ The \(\chi\) value and team games
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