Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.006zbMath1296.91015OpenAlexW2148996978MaRDI QIDQ459391

Andreas Tutić, André Casajus

Publication date: 8 October 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• On the stability of coalition structures
• Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets
• The Nash rationing problem
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Bargaining Problem
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE

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