Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.05.006zbMATH Open1296.91015OpenAlexW2148996978MaRDI QIDQ459391FDOQ459391

Authors: André Casajus, Andreas Tutić 

Publication date: 8 October 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.006

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• The bargaining problem
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• On the stability of coalition structures
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE
• Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets
• The Nash rationing problem
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS

Cited In (3)

• Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Networks and outside options

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