Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm

DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3zbMath1505.91026OpenAlexW3166998145MaRDI QIDQ2100104

Françoise Forges, József Sákovics

Publication date: 21 November 2022

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinementbackward inductionsequential rationalitygames of perfect informationcredible threat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
• Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• The simple geometry of perfect information games
• Trimmed equilibrium
• Forward induction reasoning revisited
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• On Forward Induction
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning

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