Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
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Publication:2100104
DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3zbMath1505.91026OpenAlexW3166998145MaRDI QIDQ2100104
Françoise Forges, József Sákovics
Publication date: 21 November 2022
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3
equilibrium refinementbackward inductionsequential rationalitygames of perfect informationcredible threat
Cites Work
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- The simple geometry of perfect information games
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- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- On Forward Induction
- Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
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