Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1055zbMATH Open0824.90141OpenAlexW1985261447MaRDI QIDQ1339740FDOQ1339740

Authors: John Hillas 

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1055

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zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriastable set of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cited In (16)

• Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
• Market signaling with grades
• Limited focus in dynamic games
• Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
• Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
• On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
• Stability and the chain store paradox
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality

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