Support restrictions and sequential equilibria

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90063-9zbMATH Open0627.90102OpenAlexW1972553850MaRDI QIDQ1092829FDOQ1092829

Tommy Chin-Chiu Tan, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, Vicente Madrigal

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90063-9

zbMATH Keywords

information setextensive form gamessequential equilibriasupport of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Reputation and imperfect information

Cited In (5)

• Communication in bargaining over decision rights
• Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
• Information collection in bargaining
• Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
• Multiagent negotiation under time constraints

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