Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Dynamic psychological games
- Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
- Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
- Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- On the foundation of stability
- Common theories
- An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes
- Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination
- The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
- A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game
- Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
- A note on strategy elimination in bimatrix games
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Strategic irrationality in extensive games
- Refinements of Nash equilibrium: A critique
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
- Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Backward induction and beliefs about oneself
- Computation as a correlation device
- The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- An axiomatic analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept
- On the evolution of optimizing behavior
- On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
- Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- On the invariance of solutions of finite games
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia
- Determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games
- Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- On the evaluation of solution concepts
- Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction
- Knowledge and best responses in games
- Type correlated equilibria for games with payoff uncertainty
- Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Rationalizable expectations and sunspot equilibria in an overlapping-generations economy
- Admissibility and common belief.
- The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium.
- Best-reply matching in games.
- The survival value of assuming others to be rational
- Fixed set theory for closed correspondences with applications to self-similarity and games.
- A model of noisy introspection.
- Rationalizability and the savage axioms
- Rationalizable trade
- The right to remain silent
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria
- Game theory with translucent players
- Common belief in approximate rationality
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Rationalizability and logical inference
- Salience and strategy choice in 2 2 games
- On the IENBR-solvability of two-person finite games
- Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria
- Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
- Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games
- How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- Polyequilibrium
- Bidirectional constraint satisfaction in rational strategic decision making
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- Communication with evidence in the lab
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games
- Perfect forward induction
- A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games
- On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
- Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
- An experimental investigation of unprofitable games.
- A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
- Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
- Rationalizability for social environments
- A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Endogenous correlated equilibria in noncooperative games
- On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
- On multiple equilibria and the rational expectations hypothesis
- On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
- Long-run dynamics of queues: Stability and chaos
- Rationalizable predatory pricing
- Hierarchies of compact beliefs and rationalizable behavior
- Common knowledge and limit knowledge
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