Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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Publication:1359010
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0549zbMath0872.90127OpenAlexW2027953754MaRDI QIDQ1359010
Publication date: 24 June 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0549
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