A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1007/BF01756290zbMath0631.90099OpenAlexW2095342151MaRDI QIDQ1095053

Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 1987

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01756290

zbMATH Keywords

private informationequilibrium cooperationfinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Three steps ahead ⋮ The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment ⋮ Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

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