Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2343479
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1zbMath1319.91058OpenAlexW2124113533MaRDI QIDQ2343479
Paul J. Healy, Kevin E. Pflum, Matthew T. Jones, Caleb A. Cox
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/14368/1/14368.pdf
Related Items (2)
Instrumental reciprocity as an error ⋮ Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment
- Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games
- Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
- Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end
- On chi-squared tests for multiway contingency tables with cell proportions estimated from survey data
- A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- A resolution of \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma
- Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
- On uniquely implementing cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
- How strategy sensitive are contributions? A test of six hypotheses in a two-person dilemma game
- Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
- Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'
- Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
- The Analysis of Categorical Data From Complex Sample Surveys: Chi-Squared Tests for Goodness of Fit and Independence in Two-Way Tables
- Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*
This page was built for publication: Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
