Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.034MaRDI QIDQ485607zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter McGee, John H. Kagel

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.034

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationpersonalityfinitely repeated prisoner dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• On learning to cooperate.

Cites work

• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(6)

• Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Strategic choice of preferences: the persona model
• Theory of mind predicts cooperative behavior
• Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

This page was built for publication: Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q485607)