Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
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Cites work
- A backward induction experiment
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- An experimental investigation of cooperation in the dynamic common pool game
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Continuity, inertia, and strategic uncertainty: a test of the theory of continuous time games
- Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4083411 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study
- Limited foresight equilibrium
- Limited foresight may force cooperation
- Prisoners' other dilemma
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma
- Three steps ahead
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Cited in
(8)- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
- Social motives and expectations in one-shot asymmetric prisoner's dilemmas
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Multiple motives of pro-social behavior: evidence from the solidarity game
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1512640 (Why is no real title available?)
- Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games
- CONTRITION DOES NOT ENSURE COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
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